A    REVIEW 


DIG  LEWIS'  OBJECTIONS 


Prohibitory  Liquor  Laws, 

V 


ON  THE  GROUND  OF  THE  RESTRICTION  OF 
PERSONAL  LIBERTY. 


BY      HENRY      NEW  COMB. 


PRICK,   10  crasrrs. 


HYDE   1'ARK: 

'f    California  I>KIN|KI>  AT  THE  OFFICE  OF  Tin:  NORFOLK  rot  MY  CJA/.KTTK. 

Regional 

Facility  '    ' 


1874. 


UCSB   LIBRARY 


A    REVIEW 


DIG  LEWIS'  OBJECTIONS 


Prohibitory  Liquor  Laws, 


ON  THE  GROUND  OF  THE  RESTRICTION  OF 
PERSONAL  LIBERTY. 


BY      HENRY      NEWCOMB. 


PRICK,    1O    CJ£NTS. 
HYDE  PARK: 

PRINTED  AT  THE   OFFICE  OF  THE  NORFOLK  COUNTY   GAZETTE, 

1874. 


PREFACE. 


WHEN  leading  men  differ  upon  subjects  of  vital  importance  to 
the  community,  it  becomes  necessary  for  the  people  to  investigate 
for  themselves. 

I  have  no  other  excuse  to  offer  for  placing  the  following  pages 
before  the  public. 

My  object  has  been  not  so  much  to  refute  the  alleged  objections 
against  prohibitory  liquor  laws,  as  to  show  the  true  basis  of  alco- 
holic legislation.  The  views  expressed  in  regard  to  this  may  be 
different  from  those  now  held  by  a  majority  of  the  public,  but  un- 
less they  can  be  disproved  they  must  be  correct.  Among  such 
views  no  doubt  is  that  of  irresponsibility  in  drunkenness  under  a 
license  law.  It  is  probable  a  careful  reading  will  afford  food  for 
thought  for  many  persons  for  some  time  to  come. 


NATURE   OF   THE   QUESTION. 


The  first  great  mistake  of  Dio  Lewis,  and  in  fact  of  all  who  ob- 
ject to  prohibitory  liquor  laws,  is  in  confounding  prohibition  with  re- 
striction of  personal  liberty  in  regard  to  the  drinking  of  beverages. 
Prohibitory  liquor  laws  do  not  refer  to  the  drinking  of  intoxicants, 
but  are  intended  to  regulate  the  selling,  simply.  If  the  drinking 
is  affected,  it  is  a  secondary  result,  not  the  direct  object  of  prohibi- 
tion. There  is  a  wide  distinction  between  a  law  which  criminates 
the  selling  of  intoxicating  liquor  and  one  which  should  criminate 
an  individual  for  drinking  a  beverage  in  his  own  house,  at  his 
place  of  business,  or  in  any  other  place.  This  charge  against  the 
prohibitory  law  is  a  gross  assumption,  and  has  no  foundation  in 
fact.  That  question  asked  by  Dio  Lewis  at  Hyde  Park,  "What, 
not  allow  me  to  buy  that  which  I  have  a  right  to  drink?"  touches 
the  ear  with  a  twang  of  apparent  consistency  ;  but  upon  examina- 
tion we  find  it  to  be  the  very  essence  of  ambiguity.  The  question 
is  not  as  to  what  a  person  shall  or  shall  not  buy  for  his  own  use, 
but  as  to  whether  society  can  justly  -prevent  the  sale  of  an  obnox- 
ious and  injurious  liquid  which  deceives  and  entraps  the  ignorant 
and  unwary  into  a  life  of  vice  and  crime.  In  the  social  econo- 
my of  a  well-regulated  government  there  must  be  harmony  between 
personal  rights  and  the  protection  of  society.  Society  contracts 
to  protect  the  individual  just  to  that  extent  which  it  deprives  him 
of  the  prerogative  of  protecting  himself  in  either  person,  property, 
or  character.  To  prevent  retaliation  society  has  seen  fit  to  deprive 
the  individual  of  all  prerogatives  of  protecting  himself  except  in 
those  cases  where  it  is  unable  to  extend  the  necessary  protection. 
To  harmonize  this  with  personal  rights  society  forbids  the  individ- 
ual from  being  in  any  way  molested  or  injured  in  person,  property, 
or  character  by  any  other  individual.  To  accomplish  this,  society 
enacts  a  prohibitory  statute.  It  is  prohibitory,  because  it  forbids 
under  penalty.  This  prohibitory  statute  has  never  yet  been  per- 
fected ;  it  requires  constant  amendment  and  addition  to  counteract 
the  devices  of  those  who  seek  to  defraud  or  injure  other  members 
of  society.  Here  then  we  come  to  a  point  bearing  directly  upon 
the  subject  under  consideration, — can  any  class  in  the  community 
say  the  criminal  statute  is  complete,  and  any  further  additions 
would  be  unjust?  It  is  considered  that  any  class  of 'the  community 
have  a  right  to  do  any  conceivable  thing  not  prohibted  by  statute. 


Against  this  class  of  acts  individuals  would  have  no  protection 
were  they  ever  so  obnoxious  or  injurious  ;  it  is,  therefore,  the  im- 
perative duty  of  society  (or  the  majority)  to  prevent  such  acts  by 
criminal  statute  whenever  they  conflict  with  the  well-being  of  any 
class  in  the  community.  If  Dio  Lewis  or  any  other  person  relieves 
society  of  this  obligation,  he  also  relieves  it  of  all  obligation  to 
protect  him  in  any  other  way,  and  for  these  reasons  : — 

1st. — Every  individual  in  the  community  has,  by  virtue  of  the 
protection  promised  by  society,  surrendered  up  all  right  to  protect 
himself  (except  in  case  of  personal  assault). 

2d. — As  this  surrender  extends  to  all  the  peculiar  conditions  and 
circumstances  of  life,  the  protection  must  be  of  equal  extent ;  oth- 
erwise, if  we  say  it  may  not  extend  thus  far,  who  shall  say  how  far 
it  ought  to  extend. 

If  society  be  under  no  obligations  to  extend  its  protection  in 
one  instance,  where  is  the  obligation  to  extend  it  in  another  in- 
stance? Must  individuals  be  irreparably  injured  in  person,  prop- 
erty, or  character  before  society  moves  for  their  protection  ?  That 
would  be  equal  to  a  memorable  instance  which  occurred  under  my 
observation  in  a  southern  town :  An  enraged  individual  was  going 
about  the  streets,  revolver  in  hand,  hunting  a  certain  person  with 
the  avowed  intention  of  shooting  him  upon  sight ;  a  constable  was 
following  him,  and  when  asked  why  he  did  not  arrest  the  individual 
replied,  "He  has  done  nothing  as  yet  to  be  arrested  for."  But  you 
say  society  is  under  obligation  to  do  its  utmost  to  prevent  people 
from  being  killed.  Is  it  not,  then,  under  equal  obligation  to  pre- 
vent an  individual  from  being  half  killed,  or  a  quarter,  or  an 
eighth,  or  any  at  all  ?  And  does  not  the  same  obligation  hold  good 
with  regard  to  property  and  character?  If  not,  where  can  the 
limits  be  fixed  ?  It  is  manifestly  evident  the  protection  of  society 
must  be  extended  wherever  and  whenever  protection  is  needed. 
There  are  also  obligations  on  the  part  of  individuals  as  well  as  of 
society,  and  the  whole  criminal  statute  is,  in  one  sense,  nothing 
more  than  society  defending  itself  against  a  breach  of  these  obli- 
gations on  the  part  of  individuals.  Would  there  be  no  breach  of 
these  individual  obligations,  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  a 
penal  statute,  for  in  every  case  there  is  first  a  manifest  breach  of 
some  obligation  before  the  act  is  made  criminal. 

In  this  country  society  is  the  majority,  and  government  is  simply 
the  agent  of  society.  Now  society  has,  by  virtue  of  its  existence, 
certain  rights  in  itself,  the  principle  of  which  is  to  act  for  its  own 
well-being;  and  the  course  and  constitution  of  nature  is  such  that 
society,  in  acting  for  its  own  good,  also  acts  for  the  good  of  every 
individual  in  the  whole  community.  He  who  denies  this  denies 
first  principles,  and  the  only  alternative  left  is  to  prove  that  a  pro- 
hibitory liquor  law  is  hostile  to  the  well-being  of  society.  Let  it 
be  remembered,  however,  proof  of  this  does  not  consist  in  showing 


that  a  part  of  the  community  object  to  the  enforcement  of  such  a 
law,  unless  those  objections  show  good  and  sufficient  reasons  why 
a  correct  observance  of  the  law  on  the  part  of  all  the  people 
would,  upon  the  whole,  be  productive  of  injury,  and  nob  of  benefit. 
This  I  apprehend  has  never  yet  been  done,  and,  indeed,  cannot  be, 
for  science  as  well  as  experience  proves  beyond  a  doubt  that  alco- 
hol is  injurious  to  both  mind  and  body.  Society,  as  we  have  seen, 
has  the  prerogative  of  acting  for  its  own  well-being  ;  to  do  this  it 
must  act  for  the  well-being  of  the  majority  of  its  members.'  The 
interests  of  a  community,  however,  do  not  conflict  if  those  inter- 
ests are  based  upon  principles  which  accord  with  the  course  and 
constitution  of  nature  ;  or,  in  other  words,  if  they  are  just ;  conse- 
quently, when  the  interest  of  any  class  in  the  community  conflicts 
with  the  well-being  of  another  class,  it  is  sufficient  proof  that  in- 
terest is  contrary  to  justice  and  not  allowable  by  society. 

The  limits  of  the  present  work  will  not  admit  the  demonstration 
of  the  necessity  and  justice  of  a  prohibitory  liquor  law  from  first 
principles;  suffice  it  to  say  that  society  is  divinely  commissioned 
by  the  Author  of  Nature  to  protect  the  weaknesses  of  humanity  as 
well  as  to  control  the  actions  of  the  vicious. 

At  this  point  there  is  evidently  antagonism  of  interest  between 
the  seller  of  intoxicants,  the  drinker,  and  society  ;  and  yet,  between 
the  three,  the  difficulty  must  be  settled.  It  is  evident  the  seller 
has  no  rights  antagonistic  to  the  interest  of  the  buyer  ;  this  princi- 
ple is  recognized  in  all  civil  governments  by  legislative  acts  against, 
deception  in  the  various  forms  of  fraud  and  misrepresentation.  In 
doing  this,  society  does  not  undertake  to  say  what  things  an  in- 
dividual shall  or  shall  not  buy,  nor  IB^see  that  everything  is 
offered  for  sale  which  any  individual  may  have  a  right  to  use,  but 
to  see  the  buyer  is  not  deceived,  first,  by  the  dupilcity  of  the  seller, 
and  second,  by  the  nature  of  the  thing  purchased.  In  regard  to 
the  latter  it  might  be  claimed  that  as  the  individual  bought  upon 
his  judgment  and  without  constraint,  therefore  the  responsibility 
rests  with  him  ;  yet  society  considers  itself  under  obligation  to  ex- 
tend its  protection  even  thus  far,  from  the  fact  the  individual  may 
be  deceived  if  not  injured,  and  he  has  no  right  of  himself  to  re- 
dress his  injury  and  is  powerless  to  protect,  himself  against  the 
deceit.  This  principle  we  hold  to  be  applicable  in  all  cases  where 
there  is  good  and  sufficient  evidence  of  personal  injury  resulting 
from  the  legitimate  use  of  the  thing  purchased.  In  this  respect 
alcoholic  beverages  differ  from  every  other  substance  known  to 
commerce. 

The  facts  presented  by  observation  and  coroborated  by  science 
proves  beyond  a  doubt  that  alcohol,  in  whatever  form  of  beverage 
it  may  be  concealed,  invariably  deceive.?  the  drinker,  and  drinking  is 
the  legitimate  use  of  such  beverages.  At  this  point  we  come°to 
the  tug  of  war  ;  it  is  claimed  the  legitimate  use  of  intoxicants  is 


limited  to  a  less  quantity  than  will  produce  any  visible  intoxica- 
tion, or  at  least,  this  is  as  near  the  definition  of  the  idea  as  we  can 
get,  for  the  fact/ffuch  a  use  of  liquor  can  never  he  defined.  In  the 
first  place,,  it  is  an  evasion  of  the  point  at  issue,  which  is,  that  the 
drinker  is  deceived  by  the  legitimate  use  of  the  alcoholic  beverage. 
I  do  not  mean  to  say  he  does  not  experience  the  sensations  of 
gratification  he  anticipates,  but  the  deception  arises  from  the  reflex 
influence  or  effect  of  the  alcohol  upon  his  mind,  directly,  by  its  ef- 
fects upon  the  substance  of  the  brain,  and  indirectly,  by  its  effects 
upon  the  physical  organism,  and  this  even  in  small  quantities. 
This  is  the  legitimate  effect  of  alchohol  whereby  the  individual  is- 
deprived  of  the  use  of  his  reason  in  proportion  to  the  quantity 
drank  and  the  susceptibility  of  his  mental  constitution  to  be  af- 
fected by  it.  It  is  beyond  the  reach  of  human  perception  to  know 
to  what,  extent  a  certain  quantity  of  alcohol  will  affect  any  person 
who  has  never  been  addicted  to  its  use.  The  physician  may  know 
to  what  extent  it  will  affect  the  physical  organism,  but  its  effects 
upon  the  mind  he  can  never  calculate.  How  many  wrecks  of  hu- 
manity there  are  whose  downward  course  dates  from  the  physician's 
prescription  for  an  opiate  or  a  stimulant ;  he  has  calculated  its  ef- 
fect upon  the  body,  and  in  that  regard  it  produces  the  desired  re- 
sult ;  but  how  little  he  knew  of  the  life  that  was  to  follow  from  its 
effect  upon  the  mind.  But  there  are  obvious  distinctions  here  ;  I 
do  not  mean  to  condemn  the  efforts  made  to  prolong,  life  even  at 
the  risk  of  losing  all  that  makes  life  desirable.  I  simply  bring  this 
in  to  prove  the  fact  that  alcohol  affects  the  mind  to  a  greater  degree 
than  its  visible  effects  upon  the  body  seem  to  indicate,  and  the  re- 
sults prove  both  decepiiiUfcand  injury.  This  then  we  must  consider 
as  sufficient  ground  for  interference  on  the  part  of  society  in  order 
that  the  individual  may  be  protected  from  injury. 

As  an  offset  to  this  we  are  told  an  individual  has  a  personal  right 
to  injure  himself.  Very  true  ;  so  far  as  society  is  concerned,  an  in- 
dividual may  injure  himself  by  his  own  free,  voluntary  act.  but  the 
exercise  of  such  a  liberty  does  not  release  him  from  his  obligations 
to  society  ;  when,  therefore,  the  individual,  by  any  cause  whatever, 
makes  a  breach  of  his  obligations  to  society  by  committing  a  crim- 
inal act,  society  may  institute  proceedings  to  ascertain,  upon  fact, 
whether  such  breach  was  or  was  not  caused  by  the  free  and  volun- 
tary act  of  the  individual.  Now  where  is  there  any  possible  proof 
that  any  breach  of  obligation  caused  by  the  effects  of  alcohol  upon 
the  mind  is  the  voluntary  act  of  the  individual ;  and  yet  a  crime  has 
been  committed.  Who,  then,  is  the  criminal?  Under  the  opera- 
tion of  a  license  law  the  seller  cannot  be  criminated  because  society 
grants  him  the  privilege.  Justice  says  the  drinker  is  not  a  crimi- 
nal because  he  has  been  deceived  and  overpowered  by  alcohol,  and 
through  its  effects  become  an  involuntary  actor  not  responsible  for 
acts  committed  while  in  that  condition. 


9 

It  is  not  the  intention  of  the  present  paper  to  advance  any  views 
except  they  be  supported  by  science  and  provedyto  rest  upon  rthe 
basis  of  a  sound  and  practical  philosophy.  I  therefore  have  no 
hesitation  in  saying,  that  to  whatever  extent  society  permits  or  li- 
censes the  sale  of  alcoholic  liquors  as  a  beverage,  to  that  extent  it  is  an 
equal  participant  in  the  crime  and  guilt  of  the  drinker.  Proof  of 
this  would  be  foreign  to  the  present  object.  I  only  wish  to  show 
that  the  injury  resulting  to  an  individual  from  the  drinking  of  al- 
coholic beverages,  is  not  self-inflicted  in  the  ordinary  acceptation 
of  a  voluntary  act ;  neither  is  it  accidental  in  the  ordinary  accepta- 
tion of  that  term  ;  neither  can  it  be  said  to  result  from  any  inten- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  seller  or  of  the  drinker.  Society  is  grieved, 
tormented,  and  burdened  ;  the  drinker  is  deceived,  injured,  and 
finally  ruined,  and  the  seller  does  not  mean  any  harm  ;  how,  then, 
are  we  to  clear  up  the  mystery  and  show  where  the  evil  lies  ?  I 
have  no  doubt  but  that  at  this  point  has  arisen  all  the  mistakes  of 
alcoholic  legislation.  There  is  but  one  fact  bv  which  we  can  bring 
order  out  of  this  chaos  of  contradiction  between  intention  and  ef- 
fects in  the  selling  and  drinking  of  alcoholic  beverages.  That  fact 
is,  alcohol  is  possessed  of  a  power  not  to  be  found  in  any  other 
substance  upon  the  habitable  globe,  the  power  of  imparting  insan- 
ity to  the  human  mind. 

Here,  then,  we  solve  the  whole  mystery.  Under  a  license  law 
society  indorses  the  individual's  inclination  to  use  the  alcoholic 
beverage,  making  that  the  prerogative  of  his  right  to  do  so,  and 
protects  him  in  the  exercise  of  that  right.  But  alcohol  soon  takes 
possession  of  his  inclination  and  leads  him  into  a  course  of  action 
of  which  society  his  made  no  calculation  f  he  has  been  led  to  make 
a  breach  of  his  most  solemn  obligations  to  society.  At  this  point 
we  may  consider  society  as  deliberating  thus  :  "What  shall  be 
done  with  this  individual?  That  alcohol  has  led  him  into  the  crime 
there  can  be  no  doubt ;  but  we  have  endorsed  him  in  the  use  of  it, 
and  it  will  not  do  to  give  the  lie  to  our  own  acts,  much  less  to  a 
custom  so  long  established  ;  besides,  if  we  say  he  has  done  wrong 
in  drinking,  we  shall  criminate  ourselves  and  everybody  else  who 
may  hereafter  indulge  in  this  harmless  (?)  and  delightful  beverage. 
Let  us  make  him  a  criminal  because  he  has  let  the  drink  overpower 
/lint."  (drunkenness  a  crime  in  itself).  But  here  justice  interposes 
and  says,  uHe  could"  not  prevent  th^  effects  of  the  drink  after  he 
had  taken  it ;  he  should  not  have  had  it  in  the  first  place." 

Society — "What  shall  we  do,  th^en,  to  clear  ourselves  and  save  the 
liquors?  We  will  do  this  :  we  will  make  believe  this  man  has  not 
drank  his  liquor  for  the  same  purpose  as  ourselves  and  other  hon- 
est people  ;  we  will  say  he  intended  to  bring  this  evil  upon  us  and 
himself,  because  he  needn't  have  drank  anything  in  the  first  place  : 
nobody  compelled  him  to."  (Decisions  of  English  and  American 
courts,  under  a  license  law,  that  the  drunkard  is  Voluntaries  l)<t>- 
mon.) 


10 

Justice  again,  (standing  in  the  light  of  science) — "But  you  can- 
not prove  such  an  intention.  He  began  his  drink  for  the  same 
purpose  and  with  the  same  object  as  all  others,  and  you  endorsed 
him  in  so  doing.  You  cannot  make  a  thing  right  and  wrong  at  the 
same  time.  You  must  either  condemn  the  drink  and  take  back 
your  endorsement,  or  else  let  him  go  scott  free  and  bear  all  the 
blame  yourself." 

Society  (considerably  agitated) — "But  is  he  not  responsible  for 
having  drank  the  liquor  to  excess?" 

Justice — "He  is  not  responsible  in  so  far  as  you  grant  him  the 
privilege  ;  all  responsibility  beyond  that  would  depend  upon  your 
contract  with  him  (the  law). 

Society — "It  is  impossible  for  us  to  specify  just  the  amount  he 
should  drink  ;  we  allow  him  the  privilege  of  drinking  all  he  pleases, 
so  long  as  he  discharges  all  his  obligations." 

Justice — "But  do  you  not  see,  by  the  light  in  which  I  now  stand, 
that  you  make  a  contract  with  him  he  cannot  possibly  fulfil?  He 
agrees  not  to  let  alcohol  control  or  overcome  him,  which  your  pres- 
ent knowledge  and  experience  convinces  you  he  is  powerless  to 
prevent.  The  very  terms  of  your  contract  show  that  you  cannot 
justly  hold  him  responsible  for  more  than  you  grant  him  the  privi- 
lege ;  because  your  privilege  includes  all  he  is  capable  of  r<  ndering 
under  the  circumstances.  You  grant  him  the  privilege  of  drinking 
as  long  as  he  is  capable  of  discharging  his  obligations  ;  what  obli- 
gations, then,  would  you  consider  him  ui.der,  after  he  becomes  inca- 
pable of  discharging  those  for  which  your  contract  holds  him  re- 
sponsible? Can  you  tell  me,  under  these  circumstances,  where  his 
guilt  originates?" 

Society  (angrily) — "We  don't  believe  in  metaphysical  hair-split- 
ting. As  to  the  light  in  which  3'ou  now  stand,  we  regard  our  own 
inclination  as  far  ahead  of  it ;  rum  is  better  than  science.  It  is 
expedient  for  us  to  make  this  man  a  criminal ;  we  have  the  power, 
and  it  shall  be  done."  (Justice  retires  amid  the  groans  of  the 
drunkard  and  the  clashing  of  bottles. 

The  difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  society  refuses  to  recognize 
the  antagonism  existing  between  the  legitimate  effects  of  alcohol 
and  the  intention  of  the  drinker.  If  the  effects  of  alcohol  upon  the 
mind  was  a  voluntary  matter,  I  could  make  no  plea  for  a  prohibi- 
tory law  ;  but  as  it  is,  there  can  be  no  better  basis  for  any  law 
than  is  presented  by  the  inexorable  effects  of  alcoholic  drink  upon 
the  mind,  for  that  of  prohibition,.  The  phenomena  of  intoxication 
which  has  heretofore  been  the  basis  of  all  acoholic  legislation 
under  the  license  system  has  little  more  to  do  with  the  true  legis- 
lation than  the  prostration  of  an  individual  upon  his  couch  has  to 
do  with  the  medicine  neccrsary  to  cure  the  disease  which  placed 
him  there. 

How  unwise,  how  premature  then  is  that  legislation  which  is  di- 


11 

reeled  solety  to  the  involuntary  and  outward  manifestation  of  a 
fatal  and  malignant  affection  of  the  mind  over  which  the  indivi- 
dual himself  has  no  control. 

True,  alcohol  is  a  passive  agent  until  taken  into  the  system,  then 
it  immediately  becomes  a  most  powerful  agent  of  society's  greatest 
enemy,  anarchy  or  the  loss  of  reason  over  brute  force.  This  I  have 
always  considered  as  being  emphatically  the  basis  for  alcoholic 
legislation.  In  this  regard  it  has  no  precedent ;  society  could  well 
enough  pass  it  on  the  score  of  health,  or  of  economy,  as  it  does 
hundreds  of  personal  evils  all  over  the  land.  Every  person  may 
have  a  perfect  right  to  do  as  they  please  with  their  health  and  their 
money,  but  no  person  has  the  right  to  deprive  himself  of  his  reason, 
for  the  exercise  of  that  belongs  to  society.  It  is  the  essential 
attributes  of  an  intelligent  reason  which  constitutes  man  a  rational 
being,  and  consequently  a  voluntary  agent,  free  to  act  for  himself, 
within  the  limits  precribed  by  society  ;  but  when  by  any  means  he 
becomes  deprived  of  the  control  of  reason,  he  ceases  to  be  rational 
and  it  is  impossible  for  society  to  know  what  he  will  do.  This  is 
the  legitimate  effect  of  alcohol,  which  so  changes  the  relation  of  the 
individual  to  society  that  his  existence  becomes  hostile  to  its  well- 
being.  The  motives  which  govern  and  control  the  conduct  of 
human  beings  in  possession  of  reason  no  longer  apply  to  the  per- 
son whose  reason  is  governed  by  alcohol.  He  ceases  to  be  a  sub- 
ject of  such  legislation  as  applies  to  all  other  persons  controlled  by 
reason,  not  simply  in  his  paroxyms  of  intoxication,  for  in  his  most 
sober  hours  he  is  a  monomaniac.  What,  then,  is  society  to  do? 
Build  asylums  for  these  demented  persons,  and  alms-houses  for 
their  unfortunate  offspring,  and  employ  agents  enough  to  watch 
every  drunkard  in  his  fits  of  intoxication,  to  prevent  him  from  in- 
juring the  person  or  property  of  law-abiding  people  ;  and  all  for 
what?  To  sustain  the  prerogative  of  personal  liberty!  Awa}r 
with  such  an  idea !  Where  is  personal  liberty  when  the  indivi- 
dual is  a  slave  to  alcohol,  watched  by  the  agents  of  society  for  the 
preservation  of  the  peace,  or  incarcerated  within  the  walls  of  a/i 
asylum  ?  Have  they  left  it  behind  in  the  record  of  a  noble  life, 
worthy  as  an  example  to  be  followed  by  those  who  should  become 
cognizant  of  their  acts?  Has  not  CArery  vestige  of  personal  liberty 
been  swollowed  up  in  the  vortex  of  alcoholic  appetite  ? 

Have  they  not  rather  sunk  every  vestige  of  personal  liberty  in 
the  vortex  of  alcoholic  appetite,  and  a  record  of  shame  left  to  be 
avoided  by  all  who  should  become  cognizant  of  it?  If  that  be  per- 
sonal liberty  may  I  for  one  be  forever  delivered  from  it,  and  bound 
fast  in  the  chains  of  a  prohibitory  law,  if  chains  be  necessary  to 
such  a  law. 

But  say  what  we  will  we  cannot  -deny  society  the  prerogative  of 
preventing  any  individual  dependent  upon  it  for  protection,  from 
being  deprived  of  his  reason.  If  the  prerogative  of  personal  liber- 


12 

ty  consist  in  the  "as  I  please"  of  the  individual,  it  must  neces- 
sarily limit  the  "as  I  please"  within  tho  bounds  of  all  existing 
obligations  to  society  ;  otherwise  we  shall  commit  the  mistake  of 
saying  an  individual  is  not  obliged  to  do  that  which  he  is  obliged 
to  do.  No  obligation  attaches  to  the  "as  I  please"  of  any  indivi- 
dual, for  all  personal  rights  are  exercised  independent  of  any 
moral  obligation.  If,  then,  inclination  be  a  personal  right 
(as  Mr.  Lewis  affirmed  at  Hyde  Park)  it  must  follow  that 
even  if  there  be  such  a  thing  as  moral  obligation,  inclination 
is  independent  of  it.  This  is  a  grevious  error  because  it 
makes  moral  suason,  as  well  as  legal  compulsion,  not  only  un- 
just but  absurd  ;  because  if  liquor  selling  or  drinking  be  a  right  by 
virtue  of  the  prerogative  of  inclination  or  "as  I  please,"  the  indi- 
vidual could  not  be  under  any  obligation  to  listen  to  moral  suasion, 
neither  could  he  be  moved  by  it.  There  is  no  way  of  getting  at 
his  inclination  independent  of  moral  obligation  unless  you  buy  him, 
or  force  him  ;  the  former  would  abrogate  all  law,  the  latter  would 
be  unjust  according  to  the  premises  because  it  would  be  restrict- 
ing his  personal  rights  by  legal  compulsion.  What  kind  of  a  state 
of  society  would  we  have  in  ten  years  under  such  a  regime  as 
this. 

But  suppose  moral  suasion  were  effectual  in  moving  the  indivi- 
dual's inclination,  would  it  not  be  an  act  of  injustice  to  persuade 
him  out  of  that  which  is  properly  his  right  ?  Why  should  it  be 
neccessary  to  persuade  an  individual  out  of  his  legitimate  right? 
If  it  is  my  prerogative  to  do  as  I  please  I  thank  no  man  for  tn'ing 
to  persuade  me  out  of  my  liberty,  even  by  the  gentle  means  of 
moral  suason. 

But  does  not  the  idea  of  moral  suasion  express  the  fact  of  moral 
obligation  ;  and  its  effectiveness  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  indi- 
vidual knows  he  has  no  right  to  commit  such  and  such  acts,  let  his 
inclination  be  what  it  will.  Inclination,  then,  is  subject  to  moral 
obligation,  and  a  person  has  not  the  right  to  do  as  he  pleases  when 
he  knows  it  will  be  the  cause  of  injury  or  suffering  to  others  ;  in 
accordance  with  this  we  notice  that  knowledge  and  obligation  or 
responsibility  are  invariably  commensurate  with  each  other. 

Now  all  legal  enactments,  civil  or  criminal,  aie  ostensibly  for 
the  purpose  of  compelling  individuals  to  discharge  these  moral 
obligations  toward  society.  If  laws  have  any  other  object,  that 
object  has  thus  far  been  kept  secret.  But  it  is  charged  against 
the  prohibitory  liquor  law  that  it  undertakes  to  make  individuals 
discharge  their  obligations  towards  themselves. 

Here  we  have  a  still  further  insight  into  the  ambiguity  of  Dio 
Lewis'  question  ;  if  prohibitoiy  law  forbid  the  individual  from 
buying  that  which  he  has  a  right  to  drink,  on  the  ground  of  per- 
sonal injury,  then  the  charge  would  be  true,  but  the  fact  that  such 
laws  forbid  the  selling  of  intoxicants  shows  that  it  relates  to 


13 

society  and  not  to  individuals.  Prohibitory  law  tells  us  it  is  a 
breach  of  our  obligation  to  society  tofc  sell  alcoholic  beverages,  but 
has  no  reference  to  obligations  concerning  ourselves. 

It  is  evident  an  individual  may  take  upon  himself  the  responsi- 
bility of  drinking  that  which  will  result  in  personal  injury,  and  yet 
no  law  would  interfere,  his  body  being  his  own  he  is  responsible  ; 
but  this  liberty  of  the  individual  in  no  way  makes  it  obligatory 
upon  society  to  license  one  individual  to  furnish  another  with  the 
means  of  injuring  himself;  if  he  will  he  may  obtain  it  the  best  way 
he  can,  but  at  his  own  peril.  I  have  previously  stated  that  the 
personal  right  of  an  individual  to  injure  himself  did  not  release 
him  from  his  obligation  to  society,  because  society,  if  just,  is  fram- 
ed according  to  the  constitution  of  nature,  and  according  to  nature 
no  individual  with  sane  mind  will  voluntarily  and  intentionally  in- 
jure himself.  What,  then,  ought  to  be  done  with  individuals  who 
should  voluntarily  injure  themselves  so  as  to  be  unable  to  discharge 
their  obligations  to  society?  Suppose,  for  instance,  a  number  of 
individuals  in  the  community  should  cut  off  their  arms  or  feet  so 
as  to  incapaciate  them  for  self-support  and  they  with  their  families 
become  dependent  upon  society?  Is  it  not  evident  such  a  course 
as  this  would  call  for  special  and  extraordinary  legislation?  So 
far  as  the  personal  right  is  concerned  the  individual  may  cut  off 
his  hands  or  feet,  provided  he  can  be  responsible  for  all  the  con- 
sequences ;  but  by  no  means  has  he  such  a  right  if  others  have  to 
suffer  or  bear  a  part  of  the  consequences.  Some  may  ask,  what 
analogy  there  is  between  cutting  off  one's  hands  or  feet  and  drink- 
ing alcoholic  beverages  ?  I  reply  so  far  as  his  voluntary  act  is 
concerned  it  makes  no  difference  to  society  how  the  individual 
comes  to  be  in  that  condition  which  causes  a  breach  of  his  obliffa- 

O 

tion,  whether  it  proceed  from  one  cause  or  another ;  it  is  as  much 
a  crime  for  a  person  to  incapaciate  himself  for  supporting  himself 
and  family,  by  cutting  off  his  hands,  as  it  would  he  by  drinking 
alcohol,  provided  it  be  done  voluntarily  and  intentionally.  Now 
in  this  case  society  would  have  to  do  one  of  three  things  ;  let  such 
individuals  with  their  families  suffer  all  the  consequences  and 
starve  for  want  of  sustenance,  or  support  them,  whatever  their 
number  might  be,  or  else  prevent  the  cause  of  the  evil.  I  would 
ask  if  the  latter  is  not  the  best,  the  more  just  and  equitable  way 
for  all  concerned  when  it  can  be  done  without  injury  to  any 
class  of  the  community. 

But  1  am  far  from  allowing  that  persons  who  use  alcoholic 
beverages  do  so  with  the  intention  of  making  themselves  criminals 
and  their  families  paupers.  They  have  not  made  use  of  their 
personal  liberty  with  intent  to  injure  themselves  as  in  the  case 
just  mentioned.  To  them  it  is  not  personal  liberty,  because  they 
have  been  deceived  and  -injured.  I  know  society  generally  does 
not  take  this  view  of  it,  but  the  statement  cannot  be  disproved. 


14 

If  then  such  persons  have  been  deceived  and  injured  it  is  evident 
somebody  has  done  it.  Here  again  we  refer  to  the  remarkable 
and  peculiar  effects  of  alcohol  ufbon  the  mind  ;  it  is  undoubtedly 
the  deceiver ;  yet  this  I  aver,  that  under  an_y  form  of  license  law 
society  is  auxilliary  to  the  deceit.  I  know  of  no  more  direct 
analogy  to  this  case  than  that  of  counterfeit  money  ;  it  deceives, 
yet  being  a  passive  substance,  the  crime  of  deceit  reverts  to  the 
voluntary  agent,  though  he  was  only  auxiliary  to  the  deceit.  It 
may  be  claimed  that  the  public  know  just  what  intoxicating  liquor 
is  before  they  drink  it.  I  reply,  even  if  that  be  true  the  deceit  is 
none  the  less  apparent  under  a  license  IHW,  with  this  difference 
that  society  repudiates  the  currency  of  right  to  drink  intoxicants 
in  the  case  of  those  who  are  affected  by  them,  by  criminating  such 
persons  on  the  ground  of  having  voluntarily  drank  such  liquors.  It 
is  evident  this  is  an  evasion  of  the  point  at  issue.  The  point  is, 
has  the  individual  intentionally  placed  himself  in  that  position? 
We  are  compelled  to  answer  yes,  or  no.  If  we  say  yes,  we  assert 
that  of  which  there  is  no  possible  proof,  because  such  an  act  is 
without  the  limits  of  reason,  and  contrary  to  nature.  Self-preser- 
vation is  the  strongest  instinct  of  nature,  and  we  cannot  conceive 
of  a  person  in  full  possession  of  their  reason  as  committing  inten- 
tional self-injury.  I  am  aware  of  the  fact  that  in  law  intoxication 
has  always  been  assumed  as  intentional  on  the  ground  of  preceding 
voluntary  acts.  No  doubt  the  individual  intended  to  experience 
auch  sensations  as  the  state  of  mental  intoxication  alone  affords, 
but  we  are  here  again  confronted  by  the  peculiar  effects  of  alcohol 
because  its  effects  invariably  exceed  his  intentions,  otherwise  he 
would  receive  no  injury  ;  in  fact,  the  effects  of  alcohol  are  at  com- 
plete variance  with  his  intentions  ;  his  intention  is  happiness  and 
facility ;  alcohol  deceives  him,  and  brings  misery,  degradation  and 
crime.  Under  a  license  liquor  law,  then,  society  is  auxiliary  to 
the  deceit,  but  to  justify  itself  repudiates  in  the  case  of  the  drunk- 
ard what  it  passes  as  current  coin  to  the  rest  of  the  community, 
the  voluntary  drinking  of  intoxicating  beverages.  This  act  of  in- 
justice society  does  to  protect  itself  from  the  evil  which  it  allows, 
under  the  plea  of  sustaining  the  prerogative  of  personal  liberty. 

Prohibitory  liquor  laws,  on  the  contrary,  repudiate  the  whole 
thing  as  a  cheat,  a  swindle,  a  counterfeit,  as  much  so  to  the  mod- 
erate drinker  as  to  the  drunkard  ;  and  by  that  law  softiet}'  declares 
itself  clear  of  all  duplicity  in  the  matter,  and  warns  the  community 
against  being  deceived  by  it.  Prohibitory  liquor  laws  virtually 
brand  alcohol  as  a  beverage,  in  whatever  form,  as  a  counterfeit, 
hence,  persons  who  deal  in  it  are  criminals,  as  well  and  truly  so  as 
if  they  had  attempted  to  deceive  the  public  by  passing  counterfeit 
money.  If  any  person  wishes  to  disprove  this  conclusion  he  can 
do  so  by  proving  that  every  person  who  becomes  addicted  to 
liquor  does  so  for  the  specific  purpose,  and  with  the  avowed  in- 


15 

tention  of  bringing  upon  himself  and  family  all  the  consequences 
of  a  drunkard's  life  ;  otherwise  the  conclusion  must  be  correct. 

It  will  be  seen  by  the  foregoing  considerations  there  is  no 
ground  for  an  argument  against  the  strictest  prohibitory  liquor 
law  on  the  ground  of  pensonal  liberty,  even  granting  the  individ- 
ual more  liberty  than  he  asks  for,  the  liberty  of  injuring  himself. 

It  is  unreasonable  to  suppose  any  individual  asks  for  such  a  pri- 
vilege, and  that  person  has  a  questionable  motive  who  claims  for  the 
public  a  privilege  they  in  no  wise  would  exercise  did  they  know 
as  much  about  it  as  he.  None  of  t.he  arguments  used  against  pro- 
hibition in  supposed  analogous  cases  of  personal  liberty,  in  eating 
and  drinking  such  food,  and  wearing  such  clothing  as  the  indivi- 
dual choses,  nor  personal  liberty  in  any  other  form,  has  any  bear- 
ing upon  the  subject  as  here  presented  ;  it  rests  solely  upon  the 
undeniable  evidence  that  alcohol  deceives  the  drinker  by  its  effects 
upon  the  mind,  producing  insanity  in  all  its  degrees  from  the  sim- 
ple monomania  when  the  appetite  first  begins  to  form,  all  the  way 
down  to  the  raving  mania  of  delirium  tremens. 


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